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BARRIERS TO GROWTH IN THE 
CZECH AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
Christina Pak
Introduction
 The Czech Republic has maintained a long 
tradition of excellence in industry, especially 
the automotive sector. Responsible for almost 
a quarter of total manufacturing output, the 
automotive sector is the single largest industry 
in the Czech Republic and employs more than 
150,000 people. The nation belongs to the top 
15 car producers by volume, producing slightly 
over 100 vehicles per capita (Schmid). 
 In 2010, the Czech Republic reached a 
new milestone in production and manufactured 
a million cars for the first time, most of which 
were exported (“The World Factbook…”). 
However, the nation’s dependence on foreign 
capital and the resulting foreign-controlled 
economy, lack of high-value-added research, 
and dependence on Western Europe to fuel 
its heavily export-based economy limit the 
nation to the periphery of the global core auto 
industry. 
 Nations that house the headquarters 
of original equipment manufacturers and 
therefore generate high-value-added products 
and a high level of research and development 
(R&D) and exhibit high revenue capture as well 
as leadership in the field constitute the global 
core auto industry. These nations include the 
United States, Germany, France, and Japan. 
The periphery of the auto industry, in which the 
Czech Republic resides, is comprised of nations 
that do not house the headquarters of original 
equipment manufacturers and are largely 
limited to the production of automobiles rather 
than innovation within the field (Maxton and 
Wormald, p. 99).
 Because more than 98 percent of 
automobiles produced in the Czech Republic 
are personal vehicles, in this article I largely 
focus on the auto industry in terms of the 
production of these vehicles rather than large 
commercial vehicles, such as trucks, and public 
transport vehicles, such as trams and buses 
(“Analysis of the Automotive Industry…”). I 
discuss barriers to growth in the Czech auto 
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industry from the perspectives of the Czech 
Republic as an export-oriented economy, the 
organization of the auto industry, the effects 
of foreign direct investment (FDI), spillovers 
between foreign-owned and domestic firms, 
and the unequal distribution of R&D. I suggest 
that the current organization of the industry 
gives too much power to foreign transnational 
companies, which wield this power to hold 
the Czech auto industry captive. I argue that 
the Czech government must strike a balance 
between continuing to attract FDI and 
supporting domestic-based firms. By investing 
in higher education as well as R&D, horizontal 
and vertical spillovers between firms may 
be better absorbed and utilized by domestic 
firms, thereby increasing competitiveness and 
allowing the Czech auto industry to reposition 
itself from the periphery closer to the core of 
the global auto production network.
Exports
 The Czech Republic is an export-based 
economy. In 2013, the nation’s export value 
reached $150 billion, positioning the country 
as the 30th largest exporter in the world. 
Cars compose the largest portion of the total 
export value at 10 percent, with vehicle parts 
composing the second largest portion at 7.6 
percent (“Where Does the Czech Republic 
Export Cars to?”). The Czech Republic’s main 
trading partners include Germany, France, and 
the United Kingdom (“Main Development…,” 
p. 3). Germany, a close neighbor and the Czech 
Republic’s most important trading partner, is 
responsible for 31 percent of the entire Czech 
export value (“Main Development…,” p. 5). In 
terms of the auto industry, Germany imports 
24 percent of Czech-produced cars, or $3.63 
billion of a total $15.1 billion auto export value. 
The U.K. comes in second at 8 percent, then 
Russia at 6.7 percent, Belgium-Luxembourg at 
6.1 percent, and France at 5.5 percent (“Where 
Does the Czech Republic Export Cars to?”). 
Additionally Germany imports the majority of 
Czech-produced vehicle parts at 42 percent, 
then Slovakia at 11 percent, France at 7.1 
percent, Hungary at 4.6 percent, and Russia at 
3.8 percent (“Where Does the Czech Republic 
Export Vehicle Parts to?”).
 The Czech Republic must not only 
diversify its trading partners but also decrease 
its dependence on the Western European 
region, in particular Germany, to maintain as 
well as increase demand for its exports. China, 
Russia, the U.S., and South American nations 
are promising markets (“Main Development…,” 
p. 6). Škoda Auto has already started producing 
cars at three manufacturing plants in China, 
two plants in Russia, and two in India (“Škoda 
Annual Report 2014,” p. 27). Although sales in 
Russia have declined recently due to economic 
and political conditions, demand in China 
and India continues to climb (“Škoda Annual 
Report 2014,” p. 15).
 The 2008 financial crisis served as a 
warning of the consequences of depending too 
heavily on a specific region. Banking failures in 
Europe and the U.S. (“Crisis-Proofing Financial 
Integration…,” p. 25) caused demand for 
Czech exports in Europe to drop, and the Czech 
economy suffered as a result. GDP decreased by 
5.8 percent, and the public debt increased by 
40 percent from 2008 to 2010 (“Crisis-Proofing 
Financial Integration…,” p. 28). Employment 
in the auto industry decreased by 15 percent 
from 2008 to 2009, which represented 
approximately 20,000 employees (“Analysis 
of the Automotive Industry…”). It was not 
until the rest of Europe recovered that the 
Czech Republic followed (“OECD Economic 
Surveys…,” p. 37).
 During the financial crisis, the Czech 
auto industry experienced the fastest recovery 
rates in exports to countries with scrapping 
schemes such as Germany and France (“OECD 
Economic Surveys…,” pp. 34–35). Scrapping 
schemes allow consumers to trade in an old 
personal vehicle for a set amount of money that 
would go towards purchasing a new car (“Car 
Scrapping…,” p. 1). In this manner, scrapping 
schemes boost new car sales and thus boost 
imports of new cars and car parts into these 
markets (“OECD Economic Surveys…,” 
p. 35). Consumers tend to trade in their old 
vehicles for small, inexpensive cars, which 
the Czech Republic, in particular Škoda Auto, 
specializes in producing. Therefore, it appears 
that the Czech Republic would benefit highly 
from scrapping schemes. However, despite an 
initial spike in exports to countries that have 
implemented scrapping schemes, spikes have 
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been always followed by an eventual decrease 
in the export rate. The advantage of scrapping 
schemes is therefore temporary and transient 
(“OECD Economic Surveys…,” p. 35).
 Facilitating trade may be a long-term 
solution to maintaining and increasing the 
export rate as well as global competitiveness. 
Even though operating in a completely 
landlocked economy presets a unique 
challenge, the Czech Republic boasts an 
excellent infrastructure and trade policies 
designed to make trading quick, efficient, and 
easy. With 55,717 km of roads and a density 
of 0.7 km of roads per square kilometer 
(“Investment in the Czech Republic,” 
p. 105), this nation within East–Central Europe 
(ECE) ranks thirty-seventh globally in quality 
of overall infrastructure, twenty-second in 
quality of railroad infrastructure, and twenty-
first in quality of air transport infrastructure, 
according to the World Economic Forum 
(“Investment in the Czech Republic,” p. 7). 
The Czech Republic ranks forty-ninth globally 
in ease of trade, but compared with other 
landlocked countries, the Czech Republic 
comes in at fourth based on the amount of 
documents required, cost, and time to export 
or import (“Doing Business…,” p. 19). 
 Unlike most other landlocked economies, 
which require double the number of procedures 
to import and export goods compared with 
countries situated on the coast, the Czech 
Republic boasts fewer than ten procedures 
(Bilotserkivska, p. 13). Because the Czech 
Republic is a member of the EU Customs 
Union, goods transported to and from seaports 
are not subject to any border procedures while 
crossing through other member territories 
(Bilotserkivska, p. 8). The Czech Republic 
also has implemented an electronic system 
that allows traders to complete all documents 
required for customs clearance electronically, 
significantly expediting the process 
(Bilotserkivska, p. 10). Despite the Czech 
Republic’s strong position, traders must still 
hire a customs broker (Bilotserkivska, p. 18) to 
deal with customs procedures on their behalf 
(Bilotserkivska, p. 7), adding to cost; and goods 
must wait outside the seaport before entering 
it and then are handled at the seaport, adding 
to shipping time (Bilotserkivska, p. 21).
Organization of the Industry
 The Czech auto supply chain is organized 
into three tiers. Tier 1 suppliers work closely 
with auto assemblers to design and produce 
highly sophisticated, high-value-added modules 
and auto components. Tier 2 suppliers supply 
Tier 1 suppliers and auto assemblers with lower-
value-added components. Tier 3 suppliers 
supply the entire auto supply chain with the 
lowest-value-added, standardized components 
and thus are easily replaceable and face fierce 
competition within the market. A majority 
of domestic Czech auto suppliers are Tier 3 
suppliers. Most Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers 
are foreign companies that followed foreign 
auto assemblers, with which they maintain 
an intimate and lasting buyer-supplier 
relationship, to the Czech Republic (Pavlínek 
and Žížalová, p. 9).
 The Czech auto industry is controlled 
mostly by foreign firms. Transnational 
corporations (TNCs) account for approximately 
82 percent of employment, 92 percent of 
value added, and 95 percent of turnover in 
the Czech auto industry. As a consequence 
of foreign domination of the auto industry, 
much revenue is lost in the form of dividends 
returned to TNCs. Thus the Czech Republic 
exhibits low value capture. As two authorities 
(Pavlínek et al.) put it, value capture is the 
“[share] of created value that is retained by 
firms or subsidiaries that originally created 
it and that has not been transferred outside 
the host region of those firms or subsidiaries” 
(Pavlínek and Ženka, p. 2). 
 Meanwhile, domestic firms contribute a 
meager ten percent of the total profit, assets, 
and R&D expenditures generated by the auto 
industry. Because of the close buyer-supplier 
relationships characteristic of the auto industry, 
foreign auto assemblers exhibit a preference 
for foreign supplier companies versus domestic 
suppliers, with the exception of Škoda Auto. 
Foreign suppliers are generally larger and 
therefore can produce auto components and 
modules with economies of scale, whereas 
smaller domestic suppliers cannot. Foreign 
suppliers also possess higher amounts of capital 
and have access to more resources because of 
their correspondence with other branches or 
subsidiaries abroad. Foreign suppliers enjoy 
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a long history with foreign auto assemblers. 
This enduring tradition of buying, selling, 
and exchanging information has enabled 
them to more easily reach the higher-quality 
standards imposed by foreign auto assemblers. 
Foreign suppliers have also been able to deliver 
components on the “just-in-time” schedule 
preferred by foreign auto assemblers that 
domestic firms could not match due to their 
smaller workforces and lower production rates 
(Pavlínek and Žížalová, p. 11).
Foreign Direct Investment
 Since the privatization of the Czech 
economy at the turn of the twenty-first 
century, the Czech Republic has become a 
popular destination for FDI in ECE. The Czech 
Republic boasts a proud heritage of high-quality 
manufacturing and industry in combination 
with a highly developed infrastructure. 
Additionally, the Czech Republic possesses 
a skilled workforce with relatively low labor 
costs. With membership in both the EU and 
NATO, as well as various government incentives 
for brownfield and greenfield investments, the 
Czech Republic offers a multitude of financial 
services to foreign enterprises seeking to invest 
and thus receives the highest amount of FDI in 
ECE (“Factsheet No. 1…”).
 More than 170,000 firms in the Czech 
Republic to date have attracted FDI (“Why 
Invest…”). The auto industry has received 
more than €8 million of FDI since 2012, with a 
total of approximately €4,761 million invested 
in auto components alone, making the auto 
industry third in terms of the sectors with 
the highest amount of FDI (“Factsheet No. 
2…”). Driven by foreign capital, the Czech 
auto industry has become the fifth largest 
auto producer in Europe and, next to Slovakia, 
produces the most cars per capita in the world 
(“Automotive Industry”).
 Through the transformative power of 
FDI, the Czech Republic has integrated into 
the global market, although it has remained in 
the periphery of the market (Pavlínek, “Foreign 
Direct Investment…,” p. 210). Billions of euros 
worth of investments and reinvestments by 
TNCs in the Czech auto industry have swept 
hundreds of domestic and foreign-controlled 
Czech firms into the auto global production 
network, mainly in Western Europe (Pavlínek, 
“Foreign Direct Investment…,” p. 210). 
Tax holidays, grants, and other investment 
incentives, as well as the strategic devaluation 
of the Czech koruna, all combined to drive 
the Czech Republic’s previously struggling 
auto industry to become the well-oiled 
car manufacturing powerhouse it is today 
(Pavlínek, “Foreign Direct Investment…,” 
pp. 211, 220). 
 Although the rate of FDI inflow has 
slowed in recent years, especially during the 
2008 financial crisis, FDI continues to be a 
major driving force in the Czech economy. The 
decline may be caused by the repatriation of 
profits abroad, either back to the home country 
of TNCs or to new ventures in developing 
nations further east or west (Pavlínek, 
“Foreign Direct Investment…,” p. 245). 
Reinvestment of profits into Czech-based firms 
or plants rather than repatriation would enable 
product, process, and functional upgrading 
and expansion within the industry; promote 
connections within the local community; and, 
therefore, promote utilization of domestic over 
foreign resources and prolong their lifespan 
within the host country (Pavlínek and Ženka, 
pp. 6–7).
 Despite the many benefits, the Czech 
Republic’s dependence on FDI has led to an 
industry controlled almost entirely by foreign 
firms (Pavlínek, “Foreign Direct Investment…,” 
p. 215). Due to the country’s dependence on 
foreign capital, TNCs can exert considerable 
economic, corporate, and political pressure 
to improve their bottom line. TNCs use their 
corporate power to prevent wage increases and 
even reduce current wages through threats of 
relocation further east where labor costs are 
generally cheaper. As one authority reports, 
such threats are not specific to the Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) region, as German 
“workers are threatened with relocations to 
CEE” and Romanian “workers are threatened 
with relocations to North Africa” (Pavlínek, 
“Foreign Direct Investment…,” p. 238). It is 
also not uncommon for auto suppliers to be 
driven to near bankruptcy to meet demands for 
low prices of components or face being cut out 
of the supply chain (Pavlínek and Ženka, p. 12).
 Wages in the Czech Republic have been 
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steadily climbing, from ten percent of the cost 
of German labor in 1996 to 26 percent in 2012. 
An increase in wages consequently decreases 
wage competitiveness, which is a major 
attraction for FDI. In 2013, the Czech National 
Bank devalued the Czech koruna by a tenth 
of its value to counter the increase in wages 
(Pavlínek, “Foreign Direct Investment…,” 
p. 240). 
 The power wielded by foreign firms even 
extends beyond the Czech auto industry. TNCs 
push for favorable state policies, and funds 
are often funneled into driving the profits of 
TNCs when they could be utilized to improve 
education, welfare, and other areas that 
would ameliorate the nation’s position on the 
periphery of the global economy as a whole. 
TNCs also recruit skilled workers from domestic 
firms, decreasing domestic competitiveness 
(Pavlínek, “Foreign Direct Investment…,” 
p. 244). This discourages functional upgrading 
in their supplier base to maintain their position 
of power. Finally, this creates a crowding 
out effect by exerting selective pressure on 
suppliers to upgrade equipment and protocols 
and lower prices to meet their standards and 
demands within a short time frame. Suppliers 
that are unable to compete are either removed 
from the supply chain or forced to close due 
to expenses accrued from upgrading and 
drastically lowering prices (Pavlínek and 
Ženka, p. 3). 
 Thus, FDI comes with its advantages 
and disadvantages (Pavlínek, “Foreign Direct 
Investment…,” pp. 243–44). A balance must 
be struck between continuing to attract FDI 
and improving the overall position of the 
Czech Republic by investing in its own people 
through targeted government subsidies and 
investment incentives (Pavlínek, “Foreign 
Direct Investment…,” p. 245). Among the 
investment incentives currently offered by 
the Czech government to TNCs interested in 
FDI are corporate tax relief for up to ten years, 
subsidies for job creation, employee training, 
and land acquisition as well as incentives for 
investments in disadvantaged regions in the 
Czech Republic (“Investment in the Czech 
Republic,” p. 17). EU structural funds provide 
tax deductions for R&D-related and educational 
activities (“Investment in the Czech Republic,” 
p. 37). In 2014, Škoda Auto benefited from 
government subsidies to foster entrepreneurial 
activity, cut energy costs during production, 
and construct employee training facilities. 
Škoda Auto also received benefits for investing 
in private schools, supporting student mobility 
across national borders, and involvement in 
various R&D projects (“Škoda Annual Report 
2014,” p. 101). Despite these subsidies, other 
efforts, especially within the realm of R&D, 
would be welcome and beneficial.
Research and Development
 In the Czech Republic, foreign 
domination of the auto industry and the 
consequent organization of R&D are severe 
limiting factors to furthering growth of the 
auto industry through increased production 
and sales (Pavlínek, “The Internalization…,” 
p. 281). Despite the international distribution 
of R&D through the opening of subsidiary R&D 
centers in the periphery, R&D remains largely 
concentrated in the core. The core countries 
maintain the highest percentages of total R&D 
expenditures and personnel employed in R&D 
centers in the EU. In 2007, Germany led with 
67.1 percent of total R&D expenditures and 53.3 
percent of total employees. Meanwhile ECE 
accounted for 1.6 percent of R&D expenditures 
and 4.2 percent of employees, respectively 
(Pavlínek, “The Internalization…,” p. 289).
 Even though the Czech Republic 
produces more vehicles per capita and employs 
more auto personnel per capita than Germany, 
the country still lags behind in R&D (Pavlínek, 
“The Internalization…,” p. 289). Basic research 
accounts for less than 1 percent of R&D in the 
Czech auto industry, with 2.3 percent of that 
figure dedicated to applied research and 97.1 
percent dedicated to development (Pavlínek, 
“The Internalization…,” p. 302). The result 
is that strategic research is centralized in the 
home countries of TNCs. Research involves the 
design of high-value-added products and thus 
generates higher revenue than development 
alone. In the 1990s, TNCs handled 75 percent 
of their R&D in their home countries. To this 
day, the majority of R&D is still conducted in 
the core (Pavlínek, “The Internalization…,” 
p. 282).
 R&D in the Czech Republic is mostly 
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limited to development: that is, the adaptation 
of foreign designs to suit the needs and 
demands of Czech consumers. These designs 
must also be adapted to meet the standards 
and regulations of the host country. Therefore, 
development is confined to individual plants. 
The need for establishing developmental 
centers near assembly plants in foreign 
markets has thus driven the decentralization 
and internationalization of R&D (Pavlínek, 
“The Internalization…,” p. 282). 
 In comparison to other ECE countries, 
the Czech Republic spends more on R&D than 
the rest of the region combined and constitutes 
70.4 percent of total R&D expenditures in ECE. 
The Czech Republic employs 50 percent of total 
R&D personnel in the region. Additionally, the 
Czech Republic allots 75 percent of its R&D 
to auto assembly instead of components. By 
way of contrast, Slovakia devotes 100 percent 
of R&D to components and Poland devotes 
92 percent. High levels of R&D concentrated 
in low-value-added, standardized components 
rather than high-value-added automobiles 
echoe the peripheral status of these countries in 
the global auto production network (Pavlínek, 
“The Internalization…,” p. 290).
 Škoda Auto in Mladá Boleslav expends the 
largest amount of R&D in the Czech Republic 
and is responsible for over 75 percent of total 
R&D expenditures (Pavlínek et al., 2010, 
p. 484). Škoda Auto establishes and organizes 
its own international production network and 
supplier base as well as conducting its own 
R&D. Nonetheless, much revenue is lost as 
dividends to foreign countries, thus limiting 
the contributions of lower-tier firms to the 
economic development of the host country 
(Pavlínek, “The Internalization…,” p. 294).
 Škoda Auto was purchased from the Czech 
government by Volkswagen Group (VW) in 1991 
with several conditions that were essential to 
cementing Škoda’s current status as a top-tier 
auto firm. Firstly, Škoda maintained its original 
brand. Secondly, VW incorporated the firm 
into its existing supply chain as an assembler 
of cheap passenger cars (Pavlínek et al., 2010, 
p. 485). VW also had to support and continue the 
existing Škoda model Favorit (Pavlínek, “The 
Internalization…,” p. 294). Thus, Škoda’s R&D 
remained in the Czech Republic rather than 
relocating to VW headquarters in Germany. 
As Škoda cars have grown in popularity both 
domestically and abroad, the demand for new 
models has increased (Pavlínek et al., 2010, 
p. 486). Current R&D efforts focus on designing 
and testing new models as well as assimilating 
VW technologies into Škoda models (Pavlínek, 
“The Internalization…,” p. 295).
 Overall, Czech auto firms vary little 
from those of core countries in production, 
technology, and structure. However, the lack 
of “strategic, knowledge-intensive” functions 
in the Czech auto industry, such as design, 
marketing, and R&D, prevents domestic firms 
from improving their position in the global 
value chain (Pavlínek et al., 2010, p. 484). R&D 
is also essential for functional upgrading, which 
allows firms to obtain higher-value-added 
functions that by definition propagate higher 
revenues and elevate firms to higher positions 
in the value chain. Functional upgrading 
enables upward mobility in the value chain, 
not only at the level of the individual firm but 
also collectively for the level of entire countries 
(Pavlínek, “The Internalization…,” p. 281).
 Even though auto component suppliers 
constitute 61 percent of total R&D in the 
global auto industry, functional upgrading in 
Czech-based firms, a majority of which are 
auto suppliers, has proved limited (Pavlínek, 
“The Internalization…,” p. 283). Lead firms, in 
this case TNCs, possess a vast amount of power 
and control over their smaller, dependent auto 
suppliers. TNCs control which suppliers they 
include in their production nexus by setting the 
standards for product quality, manufacturing 
operations, and delivery schedules (Pavlínek, 
“The Internalization…,” p. 285). TNCs use 
their power to discourage functional upgrading 
and therefore limit upward movement of auto 
suppliers along the supply chain, which allows 
suppliers to compete with TNCs in areas of 
higher value added and greater value capture 
(Pavlínek, “The Internalization…,” p. 285). 
 An example of the power TNCs hold over 
their subsidiaries and supply network is the 
recent “dieselgate” scandal that has caused 
shares in VW to plunge by 30 percent (Pollard). 
Due to the single shareholder structure of 
Škoda Auto, certain committee and supervisory 
powers have been shifted further up the chain 
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of command to VW for the sake of speed and 
efficiency. This is in direct conflict with the 
recommendations of the Code of Corporate 
Governance of OECD-based Companies, which 
the company adopted in 2007 (“Škoda Annual 
Report 2014,” p. 12). 
 VW’s power over Škoda Auto may explain 
the presence of a “defeat device,” or software 
that has been installed in the engines of 1.2 
million Škoda cars; however, whether the device 
was installed without Škoda’s prior knowledge 
is unclear (Pollard). By monitoring internal 
conditions within a car, the software has been 
able to detect when a car was undergoing official 
testing and thus decrease the performance of 
a car appropriately to decrease the amount of 
nitrogen oxides emitted (Chappell). According 
to a test conducted by the British Broadcasting 
Company, an implicated car operating at 
normal performance emitted more than 
twice the amount of nitrogen oxide emissions 
permitted, 435 mg/km versus the 180 mg/km 
limit under current EU regulations (Westcott). 
VW has confessed to inconsistencies in 
emissions testing of carbon dioxide produced 
by their Škoda models (Chappell).
  Moreover, tertiary education plays an 
important role in expanding R&D as well as 
bolstering economic growth in developed 
countries such as the Czech Republic. 
Nine universities in the Czech Republic 
provide technical studies to their students, 
a total of 94,579 students in the 2013–2014 
academic year. Forty percent of 20,573 
graduate students received a Ph.D. degree 
(“Investment Opportunities…,” p. 10). Five 
of these universities partner closely with 
major auto companies, such as Škoda Auto, 
Audi, and Porsche Engineering (“Investment 
Opportunities…,” p. 8). 
 As a consequence of this emphasis on 
education, the Czech Republic boasts a high 
worker education–to–pay ratio. The cost of 
labor is 45 percent that of the EU average, 
and Czech workers are paid 30 percent of 
the wages of German workers (“Investment 
Opportunities…,” p. 11). However, the average 
wage is expected to increase as the country’s 
popularity as a source of cheap skilled labor 
increases (“Czech Republic…,” p. 8).
 Overall, 50 percent of Czech R&D workers 
possess either a master’s degree or a doctorate; 
however, educated researchers are spread 
disproportionately throughout the auto supply 
chain. Researchers comprised 75 percent of 
the R&D workforce of Czech auto assemblers, 
whereas researchers comprised a mere 22 
percent of the auto supplier R&D workforce. 
The lack of highly educated workers among 
auto suppliers illustrates a focus on low-level 
development, adaptation, testing, and technical 
support rather than design, marketing, 
logistics, and other high-value-added functions 
(Pavlínek, “The Internalization…,” p. 302). 
More educated workers would increase the 
“absorptive capacity” of firms and facilitate 
functional upgrading; thus, providing and 
incentivizing higher worker education 
should be viewed as a priority (Pavlínek, “The 
Internalization…,” p. 303).
Spillovers
 The close correspondence between 
foreign TNCs and their Czech subsidiaries 
has led to a spillover phenomenon in the 
Czech auto supply chain. Because TNCs 
cannot fully insulate themselves within 
the market, competitive advantage, such as 
superior technology, production management 
and organization, and marketing strategies, 
spillover to other local companies, namely the 
domestic auto suppliers that supply the TNCs 
(Pavlínek and Žížalová, p. 2).
 Spillovers can occur horizontally within 
a given sector and vertically across multiple 
sectors. Horizontal spillovers occur when the 
entry of a foreign enterprise into a particular 
market causes an increase in competition, 
spurring increased production standards and 
efficiency to maintain market positions. This 
leads to an overall increase in the quality of 
production and management within the sector. 
Additionally, domestic firms may learn from 
the foreign enterprise and adopt production, 
management, and marketing techniques 
unique to the foreign enterprise, thereby 
increasing their ability to compete within the 
market. Thus, horizontal spillovers can occur 
within a single sector (Sančík, p. 2). 
 However, domestic firms that are unable 
to compete can experience a crowding-out 
effect in which the foreign enterprise either 
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runs the domestic firms out of business or 
forces domestic firms to switch into a less 
competitive market. Firms may be unable to 
compete due to a number of factors. A lack of 
capital may prevent firms from upgrading to the 
level of the foreign enterprise. Low absorptive 
capacity may prevent firms from adopting or 
emulating the competitive advantages specific 
to the foreign enterprise. Size limitations may 
result in an inability to produce with economies 
of scale and contend with the production 
output and cheaper prices of the foreign 
enterprise. Domestic firms also may have 
trouble competing with foreign enterprises for 
buyers if foreign enterprises maintain strong, 
pre-established buyer-supplier relationships 
(Pavlínek and Žížalová, pp. 5, 12).
 Vertical spillovers occur when other 
companies in direct contact with the foreign 
enterprise are affected positively by and/or 
adopt the competitive advantages specific 
to the foreign enterprise. Examples of such 
companies are suppliers and companies that 
provide services to the foreign enterprise as 
well as companies that are supplied by the 
foreign enterprise. In this manner, in contrast 
to horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers 
occur across multiple sectors within an 
industry (Sančík, p. 2).
 The Czech auto industry has experienced 
both horizontal and vertical spillovers 
and crowding-out effects with the entry of 
TNCs, such as VW, which acquired Škoda 
Auto company in 1991 (Návělek, p. 24); 
Hyundai Motor Company; and the Toyota 
Peugeot Citroën Automobile Czech joint 
venture (“Automotive Industry”). The rapid 
privatization of the industry after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, and the FDI boom that resulted, 
caused a significant portion of domestic auto 
suppliers to close down due to an inability to 
compete with foreign firms or to switch into 
other industries in order to survive (Pavlínek 
and Žížalová, p. 11).
 Where foreign suppliers do not 
outcompete domestic suppliers, foreign 
suppliers often seek either to acquire or to 
form joint ventures with domestic suppliers 
(Pavlínek and Žížalová, p. 11). In the case of 
Škoda, the Czech government temporarily 
protected its domestic suppliers from foreign 
competition by granting them a grace period. 
During this grace period, domestic suppliers 
continued to produce components for Škoda 
but eventually had to work their way up to 
meeting the higher-quality standards of VW. 
These efforts were undermined by the failure 
to promote strong linkages between foreign 
and domestic firms as well as linkages between 
universities and other research institutions, 
which limited the transfer of foreign technology 
and knowledge to domestic firms and thus 
limited positive horizontal spillovers (Pavlínek 
and Žížalová, p. 12). 
Conclusion
 Although the Czech Republic boasts a 
strong heritage of auto manufacturing, on a 
global scale the nation continues to operate 
on the fringes of the core auto industry. 
Dependence on foreign capital has resulted 
in excessive control exercised by large TNCs 
not only over the economy but also over the 
political sphere. This foreign domination of the 
auto industry keeps the nation’s position on 
the periphery (Pavlínek and Ženka, p. 2).
 To improve its peripheral position in 
the global automotive production network, 
the Czech Republic must invest further in 
high-value-added research and upper-level 
education. This can be done by offering 
government incentives to companies willing 
to invest in worker education and R&D and 
to enter into contracts with other companies 
or entities that heavily involve R&D. Future 
negotiations with TNCs for brownfield and 
greenfield investments should include clauses 
to either begin or maintain high-value-added 
research within the Czech Republic instead 
of transferring research to their headquarters 
in their home country. Additionally, the 
Czech Republic must support domestic firms 
to improve competitive conditions in the 
industry, all while continuing to attract FDI 
to drive the economy. Now that the country’s 
industries have successfully been privatized 
and developed, the Czech Republic is in a better 
position to negotiate more beneficial terms in 
FDI agreements.
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